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- If you run a software-dependent business and outsource development, you already know the math: contractors bill between $50 and $200 per hour, projects routinely exceed estimates, and the moment one engagement ends you start the cycle again for the next feature.
- The cost collapse was not a negotiation outcome.
- The data does not say contractors are unnecessary.
The Setup
If you run a software-dependent business and outsource development, you already know the math: contractors bill between $50 and $200 per hour, projects routinely exceed estimates, and the moment one engagement ends you start the cycle again for the next feature. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a median annual wage of $130,160 for software developers in the United States as of May 2024, which translates to roughly $62.58 per hour before benefits or overhead. Glassdoor and Levels.fyi put senior full-stack developer total compensation between $140,000 and $210,000 at mid-market companies. The Robert Half Technology 2025 Salary Guide places software engineers in the $120,000-$180,000 range depending on specialization and market.
These numbers assume one developer. A conventional software build of meaningful scope requires four to six developers, a project manager, a QA engineer, and a technical architect. For a 12-month engagement at mid-market rates, you are looking at $960,000 to $1,440,000 before a single line of production code ships. That is the baseline the industry operates on, and it is the baseline that AI-assisted development has begun to collapse.
The conventional response to high contractor costs is to negotiate rates, move offshore, or reduce scope. None of these change the underlying structure: you are still paying per-hour for per-person output. The question that matters is whether the per-person output model itself is the bottleneck. The operational data from PRJ-02 suggests it is.
What the Data Shows
Industry benchmarks frame the problem. According to Sieber & Partners, who analyzed 3.5 million commits from 47,000 developers, the median developer produces approximately 2 commits per day. Leading contributors reach 6 to 14 per day. Joint Taro research shows Meta engineers average approximately 21 commits per month, while Google engineers average 8 to 12. At these rates, building a 10-project portfolio with 2,561 total commits would require a team of developers working for over a year.
The internal data tells a different story. PRJ-02 built 10 production software systems across 596,903 lines of custom code between October 7, 2025 and February 2, 2026. Total contractor spend for the entire build period: $65,054 (QuickBooks-verified). That figure breaks down to $40,700 for the primary development contractor (CON-02), $21,854 for a secondary contractor (CON-03), and $2,500 for an initial website build. AI tools and software added $2,841, bringing the total build cost to $67,895.
The market replacement value for the same portfolio, estimated at mid-market US rates, falls between $795,000 and $2,900,000 with a projected timeline of 12 to 24 months and a team of 4 to 6 developers plus PM and QA. That is a 12x to 43x cost multiple on the actual spend.
But the headline number is not the total. It is the trajectory. Monthly burn started at $8,367 in September 2025. By December 2025, it had fallen to $1,035. By January 2026, it reached $825. That is a 90% reduction in monthly operating cost over four months. Per-project build cost tells the same story: the first project cost $7,995 in external support. Project four cost $1,680. Project seven cost $330. Project eight cost $90. Project nine cost $0. The ninth production product shipped with zero contractor spend.
Phase 3d onward (January 2026), the operation ran at approximately $105 per month in AI tooling costs -- primarily Anthropic Claude and OpenAI -- with $0 in contractor fees. That is a 620x cost reduction from the $65,054 contractor baseline to the ~$105 monthly steady-state.
How It Works
The cost collapse was not a negotiation outcome. It was a structural shift driven by three compounding dynamics.
First, every project left behind reusable infrastructure. Authentication systems, database patterns, admin interfaces, deployment pipelines, and API structures all became stored assets. By the time the eighth and ninth projects shipped, 80% or more of the foundational work was already done. Development started at the product logic layer, not the infrastructure layer. The operator's share of commits went from approximately 30% in October 2025 to approximately 93% in January 2026, while external contractor dependency dropped from approximately 70% to approximately 7% over the same period.
Second, the operator's capability expanded through execution. Tasks that required external specialists in October became internal capability by January -- not through coursework or certification, but through repeated cycles of building, encountering problems, resolving them, and storing the patterns. The system treated every completed cycle as material that fed forward into the next build. This is not theoretical; it is visible in the rework trajectory. Rework started at 45.2% during the first production deployment phase and dropped to 27.0% by the final phase -- a 40% reduction in rework rate as patterns solidified.
Third, AI tooling replaced the need for specialized contractor roles. Technical architecture, quality assurance, project management, and DevOps -- roles that would traditionally cost $8,000 to $20,000 per month each -- were handled by the operator working with AI coding tools at $105 per month. The traditional team cost for those four roles alone over 12 months: $960,000 to $1,440,000. The AI-assisted alternative: approximately $1,260 per year.
What This Means for Technical Operators and Business Leaders
The data does not say contractors are unnecessary. The first six projects in this portfolio were contractor-scaffolded, and that scaffolding was essential for establishing the initial codebase patterns. What the data does say is that the dependency curve is compressible. Once foundational patterns exist and the operator has internalized them through execution, the marginal cost of each new product approaches zero.
For business leaders evaluating software development costs: the relevant comparison is not "our contractor rate vs. their contractor rate." It is "per-project contractor model vs. compounding infrastructure model." The first model resets to zero with every engagement. The second model compounds with every delivery. In this operation, that compounding drove a 620x cost reduction over four months -- from $65,054 in contractors to $105 per month in AI tools -- while producing a portfolio independently valued at $795,000 to $2,900,000. The quality held at a 12.1% product defect rate against an industry norm of 20-50% (Rollbar, Stripe, Coralogix). And 100% ownership was retained -- no investors, no dilution, no equity sold.
The economics of building software have changed. The question is no longer how to find cheaper contractors. It is how to build a system where each project makes the next one faster, cheaper, and less dependent on external help.
Related: C1_S13 (5-Day Production Builds), C1_S14 (Solo AI-Built Enterprise Platform), C1_S15 (Custom Software vs SaaS)
References
- Bureau of Labor Statistics (2024). "Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2024." SOC 15-1252. Median annual wage of $130,160 for software developers.
- Glassdoor & Levels.fyi (2024-2025). Software engineer compensation data ($140,000-$210,000 total compensation at mid-market).
- Robert Half Technology (2025). "Salary Guide." Software engineer salary ranges by specialization and market ($120,000-$180,000).
- Sieber & Partners (2024). "Commit Velocity Analysis." 3.5 million commits across 47,000 developers (median: 2 commits/day).
- Joint Taro (2024). FAANG engineering productivity research (Meta ~21 commits/month, Google 8-12 commits/month).
- Rollbar, Stripe & Coralogix (2024). Industry defect rate benchmarks (20-50% of developer time on bug fixing).
- Keating, M.G. (2026). "Case Study: The Cost Inversion." Stealth Labz. Read case study